SQL Injection Simulator ↗
Six injection classes, from auth bypass to time-based blind. Watch the query and the database react as you type.
Two and a half years shipping production systems for Dell Technologies. Now at UNSW Sydney, fuzzing binaries, pentesting web apps and red-teaming language models.
You have been here a few seconds. That was enough to read everything on the right, without asking. It is read locally and never leaves your browser.
Run the full 22-point scan →Five tools I built that run in your browser. No sign-up, no setup. Every one of them teaches a real class of vulnerability.
Paste a token. It decodes the claims, runs ten weakness checks, cracks weak HMAC secrets by dictionary attack, then forges a valid admin token to prove the impact. JOSE implemented from scratch.
Six injection classes, from auth bypass to time-based blind. Watch the query and the database react as you type.
The ten most exploited web weaknesses, each with a request you can tamper with and the fix that stops it.
The recon panel above, taken all the way: 22 data points any website can collect about you without asking.
A jailbreak taxonomy, a prompt-injection detector and an adversarial test suite for large language models.
Fuzzers, malware simulations, wireless rigs and pipelines. Built in isolated labs, written up in full.
Built a Dockerized black-box fuzzing harness with a 4-person team for COMP6447 (UNSW) that combines mutation-based and format-aware generation fuzzing to crash 64-bit Linux ELF binaries across JSON, XML, CSV, PDF, JPEG, and raw ELF inputs.
Built a hardware-based wireless lab using Raspberry Pi to simulate Evil Twin attacks and capture WPA2 handshakes for offline cracking.
Developed a Windows malware simulation in an isolated lab demonstrating the full attack chain: registry persistence, MSBuild-based defense evasion, DPAPI/AES-GCM browser credential theft, keystroke logging, and C2 exfiltration to a remote webhook.
Embedded automated vulnerability scans (SAST, dependency checks) into CI/CD pipelines, reducing insecure code merges across ML microservices at Dell Technologies.
Fine-tuned and benchmarked five transformer architectures (T5, FLAN-T5, CodeT5, BART) to translate natural language questions into SQL, with a full training/evaluation pipeline, REST API, and Gradio UI — a solo research project for COMP9444 (UNSW).
Most security people learn how systems fail. I spent two and a half years learning how they get shipped, and why the shortcuts happen.
At Dell Technologies I put SAST and dependency scanning into CI/CD pipelines and moved ML monoliths onto access-controlled microservices. At UNSW I work from the other side: writing fuzzers, exploiting memory corruption and building attack labs on real hardware.
That is the combination I bring to a team. I can find the bug, explain it to the developer who wrote it, and help ship the fix.
The University of New South Wales
Specialising in offensive security, binary exploitation, wireless security, and web application penetration testing.
Experis IT · client: Dell Technologies
Embedded security into development workflows at Dell Technologies, focusing on DevSecOps, CI/CD pipeline hardening, and microservices architecture security.
JK Cement
Built and secured internal IT automation systems for a large-scale cement manufacturing enterprise, protecting ML workloads and internal processes.
Query this portfolio from a terminal, or go looking for the flag I left somewhere on this page.
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Find it, submit it, tell me how.
I commented it out from displaying in my source code when deploying.
Case studies and explainers from the lab. If I can't explain it clearly, I don't understand it yet.
Every tool I run on a bug bounty target, in the order I run it - subfinder through to the report - with the exact commands, what each flag does, a single recon script that chains it all together, and the free labs to practise on legally.
I'm looking for roles in offensive security, application security and DevSecOps, in Sydney or remote.